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The maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in matters relating to the internal elections of societies has been the subject of consistent judicial interpretation. Courts have repeatedly emphasized that not every dispute involving a registered society can be brought within the ambit of writ jurisdiction. The key question that arises in such cases is whether the society in question performs a Public Duty or Public Function, and whether there is a Public Law Element involved in the dispute. Unless these criteria are met, a society—even if registered under a statute—cannot be treated as amenable to writ jurisdiction.
This principle has been thoroughly examined in several judgments. In Ramakrishna Mission v. Kago Kunya, the Supreme Court drew a clear distinction between private and public law obligations. The Court held that merely discharging a function that may benefit the public does not, by itself, make an entity subject to writ jurisdiction. For a body to be amenable to writ, the function it performs must be one that is closely akin to the sovereign or public duties of the State. In that case, the operation of a hospital by a private mission, even though it served a public purpose, was held not to constitute a public function because there was no deep or pervasive state control, nor was the function exclusive to the State.
Similarly, in K.K. Saksena v. International Commission on Irrigation & Drainage, the Supreme Court reiterated that even if an organization performs certain public functions, not all its decisions or actions fall under the scrutiny of public law. The Court clarified that writ jurisdiction would lie only when the function being challenged is clearly a public law function, and not a matter governed by private law such as contracts, internal rules, or elections. The decision underlined that the mere fact of registration under a statute or receiving some form of governmental assistance does not convert a private body into a public authority.
Lower courts have applied these principles to a variety of cases involving societies. In Sushil Kumar v. Central Registrar of Cooperative Societies, it was held that a cooperative society’s byelaws constitute a private contract between its members and cannot, by themselves, become the basis for invoking writ jurisdiction unless statutory obligations are involved. The court found that violation of byelaws does not involve any element of public law and, therefore, cannot be the subject of a writ.
A similar conclusion was reached in Dr. Saravana Kodandapani v. All India Ophthalmological Society, where the Court examined whether the internal election of a professional society could be challenged through a writ petition. The court observed that the society did not receive any government funding, did not perform any statutory or sovereign function, and was not subject to any administrative or financial control by the State. As such, it operated purely in a private domain, and internal disputes—including elections—were not amenable to judicial review under Article 226.
Likewise, in Sajal Mitra v. The Institution of Engineers (India), the court again distinguished between regulatory oversight and public control. It observed that although such societies may be governed by certain statutory norms for registration or functioning, they do not perform duties comparable to those of government institutions. The core issue—concerning election procedures within the society—was regarded as a matter internal to the organization, with no impact on the public at large or any involvement of public law.
These judgments collectively affirm a settled position in Indian administrative law: a writ petition under Article 226 is not maintainable in matters concerning the private affairs of a society, such as elections, unless the society discharges a public duty, is subject to pervasive state control, or the issue involves a public law element. Even if a society is regulated by statute or performs functions that incidentally benefit the public, that is not enough to bring it within the purview of public law. As a result, aggrieved members of societies must pursue remedies through appropriate civil suits or arbitration mechanisms provided under the society’s byelaws or the applicable statutes.